Summer 2026
Mandamus Decisions

Twenty-Six Months in § 221(g) Administrative Processing Held Not Unreasonable

A U.S.-citizen husband petitioned for his Iranian wife, who was interviewed at the U.S. Embassy in Yerevan in April 2024, refused under INA § 221(g), and left in administrative processing with no further action for over two years. Judge Mehta dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) without reaching the government’s no-duty and consular-nonreviewability arguments, resolving the case entirely on the TRAC factors at the pleading stage.

On factors one and two, the court reaffirmed that 8 U.S.C. § 1571(b)’s 180-day “sense of Congress” is aspirational under Da Costa v. Immigrant Investor Program Office, 80 F.4th 330 (D.C. Cir. 2023), and that the FAM’s 30/60-day guidance supplies no yardstick either. Applying the Sarlak v. Pompeo case-law spectrum — delays of three to five years “often not unreasonable” in the District — the court placed 26 months comfortably “within the range of reasonableness.” Factor four (line-jumping) did the rest, with the court quoting Khazaei v. Blinken: any relief would be a “judicial reordering” of the State Department’s queue.

One quietly useful holding survives the loss: the court rejected the government’s standing attack on the National Vetting Center defendant, holding that an allegation that the NVC contributes to administrative-processing delay is enough at the pleading stage for traceability and redressability.

EB-5: Jurisdiction Preserved, Merits Denied — the RIA’s 120-Day Goal Is Not a Deadline

A Mexican investor with $800,000 in a high-unemployment-area regional center project waited nearly two years for adjudication of his Form I-526E — against the EB-5 Reform and Integrity Act’s fee-setting goal of 120 days. Judge Bates dismissed, but the opinion’s jurisdictional holding is the part practitioners should keep.

The government argued that 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)(E)(ii)’s “may process petitions in a manner and order established by the Secretary” language strips jurisdiction over pacing claims under § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), citing Bouarfa v. Mayorkas and iTech v. Renaud. The court disagreed: unlike the triple-discretion revocation statute in Bouarfa, a single “may” without a “deems”-type standard does not clearly bar review — and the court expressly criticized Mukkavilli and Aiteliyev for conflating the cause-of-action question with subject-matter jurisdiction. The opinion also engages the Supreme Court’s brand-new decision in Mullin v. Doe (U.S. June 25, 2026) on the scope of a “determination.”

On the merits, however, the court found no plausible allegation of unreasonable delay: USCIS applies a rule of reason to I-526E processing, the 120-day figure is a fee-setting goal rather than a congressional timetable, and relief would simply let the plaintiff jump the queue.

Karimova Applied Again: No Duty to Act After a § 221(g) Refusal

A U.S. citizen sued over her husband’s I-130 immigrant visa, refused under § 221(g) at the Montreal consulate in December 2024 and parked in administrative processing since. Judge Leon granted dismissal on the narrowest and most dangerous ground for consular-delay plaintiffs: after a § 221(g) refusal there is no clear, nondiscretionary duty to take any further action at all.

The court leaned on the D.C. Circuit’s unpublished decision in Karimova v. Abate (D.C. Cir. July 24, 2024): 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) imposes no “crystal-clear legal duty” on consular officers to re-adjudicate. Plaintiff’s attempts to source a duty in 8 U.S.C. § 1202(b), § 1153(a), and 22 C.F.R. § 42.21(a) fared no better, with the court collecting the growing post-Karimova line — Yaghoubnezhad, Ibrahim, Rezvani, Pour, and this February’s Alnaddaf v. Rubio.

Notably, Judge Leon acknowledged the intra-district split over whether Karimova binds, and declined to decide — finding its reasoning persuasive was enough. The court never reached consular nonreviewability or the TRAC factors.

Defendant Selection Matters: H-1B Delay Suit Dismembered on Standing Before Reaching the Merits

An H-1B specialty worker stranded in India after two successive § 221(g) refusals — separated from his U.S.-citizen wife and children and at risk of losing his job — sued the Secretary of State, senior consular-affairs officials, the DHS Secretary, the Attorney General, and the FBI Director. Judge Kelly dismissed the entire case, and the route matters as much as the result.

Claims against the DHS Secretary failed because USCIS had already approved the I-129 petition — its role was over (whether framed as mootness under Brzezinski or standing under Whitlock). Claims against the Attorney General, FBI Director, Secretary of State, and the Senior Bureau Official failed for lack of traceability: generic supervisory authority over “consular operations” or “background checks” does not plausibly connect those officials to one applicant’s delay. What remained against the consular officers was then dismissed — the mandamus count for lack of jurisdiction and the APA count for failure to state a claim.

Eight Months Is Not Unreasonable Delay — O-1 CEO’s Suit Dismissed on TRAC at the Pleading Stage

The CEO of a U.S. company — an O-1A extraordinary-ability petition approved through 2027 — was refused under § 221(g) at the Frankfurt consulate in January 2025, responded to every document request within days, and then heard nothing but boilerplate for eight months before filing suit. Judge Howell granted dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).

Faced with the government’s standard trio — no nondiscretionary duty, consular nonreviewability, and failure to plead unreasonable delay — the court chose the merits ground: eight months of administrative processing does not plausibly allege unreasonable delay under TRAC, whatever the business and family costs. The opinion is a clean illustration that in the D.D.C. the clock, not the hardship, usually decides these motions at the threshold.

What Summer 2026 Teaches About Surviving the Motion to Dismiss

Five decisions, five government wins — but through three distinct doors: the Karimova no-duty holding (Wazir), TRAC applied at the pleading stage (Ghaffari Ajrabadi at 26 months; Oystacher at 8 months), and party-by-party standing dismemberment (Sharma). Only Perez Correa Camarena gives plaintiffs something to cite, and only on jurisdiction.

The composite lesson: (1) the D.D.C. is now the hardest forum in the country for consular § 221(g) delay claims — venue analysis belongs at the top of the engagement, not the appeal; (2) delay length remains the dominant variable, and anything under three years needs extraordinary factor-three facts; (3) complaints must be built backwards from Karimova and Da Costa, not from the FAM’s aspirational timelines; and (4) defendant selection is substantive strategy, not caption decoration.