Case Law Analysis
Thirteen Notable DOS Mandamus Decisions,
2020 to 2026
The cases below tell the story of how the law in this area has tightened over the past five years — from a permissive D.D.C. environment in 2020 in which § 221(g) refusals were routinely treated as interim, through the D.C. Circuit's hardening on the merits in Baan Rao and on the TRAC analysis in Da Costa, to the post-Khazaei baseline under which delays of less than a year are presumed reasonable, then to the post-Muñoz environment in which the government argues consular nonreviewability with renewed force, and finally to the Karimova line of 2024–2026, under which a growing number of D.D.C. judges hold that a § 221(g) refusal discharges the only duty the law imposes, so that there is nothing left for a court to compel. The four most recent entries, decided between July 2024 and October 22, 2026, are where the law stands today.
Vulupala v. Barr
An H-1B applicant whose visa was refused at a consular post under § 221(g) and placed in extended administrative processing brought a mandamus action seeking to compel adjudication. The government moved to dismiss, arguing that the § 221(g) refusal was a final consular decision that triggered nonreviewability under Saavedra Bruno.
The court rejected that framing. A § 221(g) "refusal subject to further administrative processing," the court reasoned, is not the kind of final adjudicatory decision that the consular nonreviewability doctrine protects. The post had not yet completed the security advisory opinion process and had not committed to a final outcome; the visa had been neither issued nor permanently refused. The mandamus claim was therefore not barred by nonreviewability at the pleading stage, although other grounds for dismissal were addressed separately.
Why It Matters
Vulupala is the foundational D.D.C. authority for the proposition that § 221(g) is interim, not final — the doctrinal premise on which all subsequent consular-delay litigation in the District has been built. Plaintiffs cite it in nearly every opposition to a motion to dismiss in a consular mandamus case.
Bagherian v. Pompeo
A consular post had refused to schedule an interview on a duly filed visa application. The government moved to dismiss on consular nonreviewability and on the absence of a non-discretionary duty.
The court denied the motion as to the mandamus claim. It identified a non-discretionary duty under 22 C.F.R. § 42.81 to take action on a visa application, distinguishing the Mandel/Saavedra Bruno line of authority on the ground that those cases concerned review of a consular decision, while Bagherian concerned the absence of any decision at all. The court held that compelling action where none has issued is doctrinally distinct from compelling a different result on a decision that has issued.
Why It Matters
Bagherian is the early D.D.C. authority for the structural distinction between "compelling action" and "reviewing a decision." It is consistently cited in plaintiff-side complaints alongside Vulupala and pre-dates the harder line that the D.C. Circuit later took in Baan Rao.
Baan Rao Thai Restaurant v. Pompeo
Thai cooks denied E-2 visas at the consular post sued under the APA, arguing that the U.S.–Thailand Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations supplied an express authorization for judicial review. The district court dismissed; the D.C. Circuit affirmed.
The panel reaffirmed Saavedra Bruno and held that no provision of the Treaty of Amity expressly authorized judicial review of consular decisions. Importantly, the court clarified that dismissal under consular nonreviewability is a dismissal on the merits, not a jurisdictional dismissal — meaning Rule 12(b)(6) is the correct vehicle and the dismissal carries preclusive effect.
Why It Matters
Baan Rao is the controlling D.C. Circuit authority for the proposition that, once a consular decision has issued, the case is essentially over. It is the primary case the government cites when urging that a § 221(g) refusal — if the court treats it as final — invokes nonreviewability and ends the litigation.
Al-Gharawy v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security
An immigrant visa applicant whose case had sat in administrative processing for years sued for unreasonable delay. The government invoked consular nonreviewability and, as a fallback, argued that the Secretary of State was an improper defendant because the Secretary lacks operational control over the pace of consular adjudications.
The court rejected the nonreviewability argument under the Vulupala/Bagherian framework — § 221(g) is interim, not final, and consular nonreviewability does not bar a delay claim where no decision has issued. On the proper-defendant question, the court held that the Secretary is a proper defendant for the timing of consular adjudications, even if the Secretary lacks authority over the substantive grant or denial.
Why It Matters
Al-Gharawy is the most-cited recent D.D.C. authority for the propositions that (a) a § 221(g) refusal does not foreclose a delay claim and (b) the Secretary of State is a proper defendant for timing. Plaintiff-side complaints filed in the District today typically cite it within the first two pages.
Da Costa v. Immigration Investor Program Office
EB-5 investors who had waited multiple years for I-526 adjudication sued for unreasonable delay under the APA. The district court dismissed; the D.C. Circuit affirmed.
Although Da Costa was a USCIS case, not a DOS case, it is the controlling D.C. Circuit application of the TRAC factors and is now invoked in nearly every consular delay opinion in the District. The court held that TRAC factors one and four are the "most important" — whether the agency is following a "rule of reason" in its sequencing, and whether expediting one applicant would interfere with agency activities of higher or competing priority. Because USCIS's visa-availability-screened queue was a "rule of reason" and ordering individual expedition would amount to judicial line-jumping, the complaint failed to state a claim.
Why It Matters
Da Costa imported a forceful "no judicial line-jumping" principle into TRAC analysis in the D.C. Circuit. After Da Costa, every D.D.C. court that has dismissed a consular mandamus complaint at the pleading stage has done so by quoting the "factors one and four are most important" framing.
Khazaei v. Blinken
An F-1 student visa applicant whose case had been in administrative processing for several months sued for unreasonable delay. Judge Boasberg, applying the post-Da Costa framework, granted the government's motion to dismiss.
The court accepted the reviewability premise — § 221(g) refusals do not automatically trigger consular nonreviewability for delay claims — but held that the plaintiff failed the TRAC analysis on the face of the complaint. The court articulated what has since become a rule-of-thumb in the District: "absent a shorter statutory timeline, a delay of less than a year is not unreasonable." The court further held that visa-adjudication delays are "generally resource-allocation decisions that do not lend themselves to judicial reorderings of agency priorities" — TRAC factor four reasoning at its most direct.
Why It Matters
Khazaei is the D.D.C. authority most often quoted against new plaintiffs. The "less than a year is not unreasonable" articulation became a de facto threshold; the resource-allocation framing supplies the doctrinal vocabulary for dismissal under TRAC factor four. By autumn 2026 the practical threshold had moved well past a year: delays of twenty-six months (Abdulla v. Fagin, Sept. 21, 2026) and twenty-eight months (Sluev v. Rubio, Oct. 22, 2026) were held reasonable on the pleadings.
Rashidian v. Garland
A consular delay case dismissed at the pleading stage by direct application of the Khazaei/Da Costa framework. The court held that the complaint did not allege a delay sufficiently prolonged or unreasonable to overcome the resource-allocation reasoning, and that ordering individual expedition would interfere with the consular processing queue.
The dismissal was without prejudice, leaving open the possibility of refiling once the delay reached a length that the court would treat as cognizably unreasonable.
Why It Matters
Rashidian is a representative example — there are now many such opinions — of how the post-Khazaei, post-Da Costa framework operates in practice. It is also a useful illustration of the without-prejudice dismissal pattern: courts will often leave the door open for the same plaintiff to refile after additional delay accrues.
Zadeh v. Blinken
A K-1 fiancé(e) visa case in which the consular post had issued a § 221(g) refusal in May 2023, after which the petitioner-spouse and the K-1 applicant filed a mandamus complaint. The Northern District of Illinois dismissed.
The court held that, because the post had already issued a refusal, the delay claim was moot — there was no further duty for the court to compel — and the consular nonreviewability doctrine barred any judicial review of the refusal itself. The decision is a clean illustration of the "refusal moots the delay claim, then nonreviewability finishes the job" pattern that increasingly defines outcomes outside the D.D.C.
Why It Matters
Zadeh illustrates the strategic risk of filing too late — that is, after a § 221(g) refusal has already issued. It also illustrates the divergence between the D.D.C., where § 221(g) is treated as interim, and other districts that may treat it as a final decision triggering nonreviewability.
Department of State v. Muñoz
Sandra Muñoz, a U.S. citizen whose Salvadoran husband had been refused an immigrant visa, sued contending that her own constitutional liberty interest in her marriage required the consular officer to provide more than the boilerplate denial that had issued. The Ninth Circuit had agreed; the Supreme Court reversed.
In an opinion authored by Justice Barrett, the Court held that a U.S. citizen has no fundamental liberty interest in her noncitizen spouse's admission to the United States. The right to marry, the Court reasoned, does not entail a constitutional right to live in the country with one's spouse, and Congress has not made spousal immigration a matter of right. The Court reaffirmed the consular nonreviewability framework and the Mandel "facially legitimate and bona fide reason" standard.
Critically, Muñoz did not address mandamus over delay, did not hold that all consular decisions are categorically unreviewable, and did not overrule the Vulupala/Al-Gharawy line on § 221(g) interim refusals. But the Department of Justice has used Muñoz to argue, with increasing aggression, that delay-based claims against the State Department implicate the same separation-of-powers concerns the Court invoked in Muñoz — and at least some district courts have been receptive.
Why It Matters
Muñoz is the most consequential development in consular litigation in a generation. It does not formally close off mandamus over delay, but it has plainly chilled the practice and reshaped DOJ briefing. Any consular mandamus complaint filed today is litigated in Muñoz's shadow.
Karimova v. Abate
An immigrant visa applicant refused under § 221(g) and held in administrative processing sued to compel a decision, resting the asserted duty on 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) alone. The D.C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal. Section 555(b), the panel said, "simply expresses a congressional view that agencies should act within reasonable time frames" and imposes no clear, non-discretionary duty to re-adjudicate an already-refused application. The applicant had "received the 'refused' decision that the law expressly authorizes as one of the allowed actions on a visa application"; keeping the file open in administrative processing is a discretionary courtesy that "can only benefit, never hurt" her prospects.
The panel expressly reserved whether consular nonreviewability applies to a challenge to the timing rather than the content of a consular decision, and the court twice declined to publish the opinion (order of September 10, 2024).
Why It Matters
Karimova is the government's lead authority in every consular delay motion filed since. Because it is unpublished, D.C. Circuit Rule 36(e)(2) says the panel saw no precedential value in it, and the District has split for two years on whether to follow it anyway. That split is now the single most important variable in a consular case: a judge who follows Karimova dismisses without reaching TRAC; a judge who does not usually reaches TRAC and dismisses there.
Jahani v. Armstrong
A pro se immigrant-visa applicant, an Iranian-born citizen of Norway interviewed in Sweden and refused under § 221(g), sued to compel adjudication. Judge Nichols dismissed in four pages. Karimova, "unpublished or not," was persuasive authority the court chose to follow: the applicant had received the refusal the regulations authorize, and no statute or regulation commands any further action. The court added that, under Karimova's logic, a refusal followed by administrative processing "is itself a decision of exclusion to which the consular nonreviewability doctrine would likely apply," though it did not need to decide the point.
On its own motion the court also held that the plaintiff lacked standing to sue the Secretary of State, because an order against the Secretary would not redress the delay; only the Ambassador who oversaw the post, and perhaps the Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs, were proper defendants. The Attorney General and the U.S. Attorney were dismissed on the same ground.
Why It Matters
Two lessons. Judge Nichols joins the Karimova column. And defendant selection is now a jurisdictional trap in this District: a complaint that names the Secretary and the Attorney General but not the post invites dismissal before the merits are reached.
Vahida v. Namdar
An F-1 applicant, a dual citizen of Finland and Iran admitted to a doctoral program at the University of Arizona, interviewed in Helsinki on April 3, 2025, was refused under § 221(g), completed the DS-5535, and was still in administrative processing eighteen months later. Judge Moss, the author of Janay v. Blinken (2024) and until now one of the District's more plaintiff-receptive voices on consular delay, granted the motion to dismiss on the no-duty ground alone and never reached nonreviewability or TRAC.
Acknowledging that Karimova is unpublished and that the District is split on its precedential force, the court found its reasoning persuasive: § 555(b) imposes no clear duty to re-adjudicate a refused application. The embassy's statement that the applicant "will receive another adjudication once such processing is complete" did not distinguish the case; Al-Saedi v. Nepal (D.D.C. Mar. 18, 2026) and Hurtado v. Foley (D.D.C. Sept. 29, 2025) had applied Karimova despite identical language. The argument that a Security Advisory Opinion is mandatory "begs the question," because the plaintiff must first show that administrative processing itself is mandatory. The Foreign Affairs Manual does not carry the force of law. And 22 C.F.R. § 41.121(a), the nonimmigrant analogue of § 42.81(a), imposes a binary duty — issue or refuse — that the § 221(g) refusal discharged; the instruction in § 41.106 to process applications "promptly" is no more specific than § 555(b). The mandamus count was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the APA count for failure to state a claim. A footnote preserves the court's earlier holding that consular nonreviewability does not bar delay claims: whether a duty exists, the court said, is a different question from whether the doctrine applies.
Why It Matters
This is the decision that changes the forecast. When a judge who held the door open on reviewability concludes that there is no duty to walk through it, the Karimova position has moved from one wing of the court to its center. A plaintiff who draws Judge Moss, Judge Nichols, Judge Leon, or Magistrate Judge Harvey now loses on the pleadings regardless of how long the delay has run. Judges AliKhan (Abdulla, Sept. 21, 2026), Cobb (Drokin, Oct. 5, 2026), Mehta, and Boasberg continue to reject Karimova; their plaintiffs lose on TRAC instead.
Sluev v. Rubio
An F-1 applicant admitted to a master's program at Dartmouth had been in administrative processing since June 26, 2024. In February 2026 Judge Mehta denied the government's motion to dismiss, reading Karimova narrowly (it held only that § 555(b) imposes no duty to re-adjudicate, without addressing any other source of law) and reaffirming that consular nonreviewability does not shield agency inaction. The government then moved for judgment on the pleadings on TRAC alone, and won.
The plaintiff argued that the TRAC framework is atextual and should not govern; the court held that Da Costa forecloses the argument and that the same standard governs the APA and mandamus counts. On the factors: 8 U.S.C. § 1571(b) is aspirational; the Wu declaration describing the Security Advisory Opinion process shows a rule of reason even if processing is not first-in, first-out; twenty-eight months is "within the range of reasonableness" under the Sarlak case-law yardstick (three to five years "often not unreasonable"); and factor four favors the government "even when no formal queue has been established." Factors three and five weighed "modestly" for the plaintiff, since F-1 adjudication "is not a zero-sum game," but not enough. The mandamus count fell because the APA supplies an adequate remedy.
Why It Matters
Sluev is the other half of the trap. A plaintiff who wins the duty question and survives the motion to dismiss still faces a second dispositive motion on TRAC, and the case-law yardstick now treats anything under three years as presumptively reasonable. Abdulla v. Fagin (twenty-six months) and Drokin v. Rubio (duty found in 8 U.S.C. § 1202(b) and 22 C.F.R. § 42.81(e), then dismissed on TRAC) made the same point in the same month.