603 U.S. 369 (2024) · Chief Justice Roberts, 6-2
For forty years, federal courts deferred to administrative agencies' reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutes. On June 28, 2024, that doctrine ended. Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo overruled Chevron and assigned the determination of statutory meaning back to the federal courts. For immigration mandamus practice, the implications are substantial — and almost entirely favorable to plaintiffs.
The Supreme Court's decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024), came together with its companion case, Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce, on June 28, 2024. The combined ruling was 6-3 in Relentless and 6-2 in Loper Bright (Justice Jackson recused). Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the majority, and the opinion held that the Administrative Procedure Act, properly read, requires federal courts to "exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority." The deference framework set out in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), was overruled.
For four decades, the Chevron doctrine had structured federal administrative law around a familiar two-step. At Step One, the court asked whether Congress had spoken directly to the precise question at issue; if Congress had, the court enforced the unambiguous statutory text. At Step Two, if the statute was ambiguous, the court asked whether the agency's interpretation was a "permissible construction" of the statute and, if so, deferred. Chevron made the agency the primary interpreter of ambiguous statutory commands and left the courts in the role of reasonableness-checkers.
Loper Bright dismantled that framework. The Court returned the duty of statutory interpretation to the courts. Agency expertise still matters, but it now operates under the older and weaker Skidmore framework — the principle from Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), that an agency's interpretation carries respect commensurate with the thoroughness of its reasoning, the consistency of its position, and its persuasive power. Skidmore respect is not deference; the court ultimately decides what the statute means.
The simplest way to understand Loper Bright's effect is to set the pre-2024 and post-2024 frameworks side by side. The doctrinal shift is sharper than the surrounding rhetoric sometimes acknowledges.
| Before Loper Bright (Chevron) | After Loper Bright (Skidmore) | |
|---|---|---|
| Who decides statutory meaning? | The agency, where the statute is ambiguous and the agency's reading is reasonable | The court, exercising independent judgment |
| What weight does the agency receive? | Binding deference at Chevron Step Two if ambiguity is found | Respect proportionate to the agency's reasoning, consistency, and persuasive force |
| What if the statute is ambiguous? | The agency's reasonable construction controls | The court resolves the ambiguity itself using traditional tools of statutory construction |
| What if the agency changes position? | The agency could change interpretations; courts deferred to current interpretation | Inconsistency reduces the weight given to the agency's view under Skidmore |
| Who bears the interpretive burden? | Plaintiff had to show the agency's reading was unreasonable | The court determines the best reading; neither party has to "beat" the agency |
Two important deference doctrines survive. First, where Congress has expressly delegated authority to an agency to elucidate a statutory term — for instance, "the Secretary may by regulation define X" — the agency's exercise of that delegated authority is reviewed for whether it remains within the boundaries of the delegation, not whether the court would have read the statute the same way. Second, the Auer/Kisor framework for deference to agency interpretations of their own regulations remains intact, though heavily constrained by Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S. 558 (2019). And the Court explicitly preserved the holdings of cases that had relied on Chevron — those decisions remain good law, even if the deference framework underlying them is gone.
For federal immigration mandamus practice, Loper Bright shifts several arguments in the plaintiff's favor. The shift is not earthquake-scale — the core mandamus standard, the TRAC factors, and the Norton discrete-action rule all operate independently of Chevron. But the marginal effects are real and they accumulate.
The APA's command at 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) requires agencies to conclude matters within a "reasonable time." USCIS and the Department of State have, for decades, taken the position that what counts as "reasonable" is committed to their own administrative judgment, citing posted processing times and resource constraints as the operative measures. Under Chevron, courts often gave that interpretation respectful weight. Under Loper Bright, the question of what § 555(b) actually requires belongs to the court. The agency's posted processing times remain evidence, but they no longer carry deferential force. A plaintiff arguing that 36 months of pending I-485 review is unreasonable per se is no longer arguing against a presumption — the court will decide the meaning of "reasonable time" itself.
USCIS frequently issues policy memoranda interpreting statutory provisions and adjudication standards. Under Chevron's shadow, those memoranda often carried interpretive weight in litigation even when they were not formal regulations. Loper Bright changes the analysis. Where a USCIS memorandum interprets an INA term, the court now decides what the term means using traditional tools of statutory construction. The memorandum is one input — relevant under Skidmore where it is well-reasoned, consistent, and persuasive — but it is not entitled to the deference it once received.
A recurring government defense in mandamus litigation is that the underlying decision involves significant agency discretion that the court should not displace. Where that argument has rested on the agency's own interpretation of how much discretion the INA confers, Loper Bright opens it to fresh scrutiny. The question becomes: what does the statute actually authorize, as a matter of law? Where the answer is "less than the agency has claimed," the discretionary-scope defense weakens.
Although the deference has fallen, Skidmore still requires the court to give weight to agency reasoning that is thorough, consistent, and persuasive. Plaintiffs should not assume that the government's interpretation is now disregardable. Where USCIS has applied a consistent rule over many years through reasoned decisional output, Skidmore still gives that record meaningful interpretive weight. The change is that weight replaces deference — the court decides, but informed by the agency's view.
The end of Chevron changes how a well-drafted mandamus complaint and opposition to a motion to dismiss should be structured. Five adjustments are now standard.
It is worth being precise about what Loper Bright did not do. Several elements of the pre-2024 framework remain intact.
Mandamus is still extraordinary. The Loper Bright shift is about how courts review agency interpretations of statutes. It does not lower the substantive mandamus standard, alter the TRAC factors, change the Norton discrete-action rule, or eliminate the requirement that the plaintiff identify a clear duty and a clear right. The decision recalibrates the interpretive backdrop against which those doctrines operate.
Pre-existing cases relying on Chevron survive. The Court was emphatic that the holdings of cases that had relied on Chevron remain good law. A plaintiff cannot reopen a settled doctrinal question simply because the deference framework that produced it has fallen. The change is prospective in interpretive effect, not retroactive in result.
Expressly delegated authority is still respected. Where Congress has expressly delegated to an agency the authority to "define" or "elaborate" or "specify" terms — language of explicit delegation — the agency's exercise of that authority is reviewed for whether it remains within the delegation, not whether the court would have drawn the line differently. Those statutory delegations remain intact.
Some immigration delegations are explicit. The INA contains numerous provisions that explicitly commit decisions to the Secretary's discretion. Those provisions are independently barred from review under § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) and remain so. Loper Bright does not open up review of those decisions; it changes how courts read statutes more generally.
Less than two years out from Loper Bright, the lower courts are still developing the post-Chevron body of case law. Some immigration cases have already turned on the shift; many more will in the next several terms. A complaint drafted today should both flag the doctrinal change where relevant and stay grounded in the durable elements of mandamus practice that Loper Bright left untouched. The advantage to plaintiffs is real but should not be overplayed.
My practice is federal immigration mandamus — compelling USCIS and the Department of State to act on unreasonably delayed applications. Every complaint and opposition brief I file is built for the post-Loper Bright doctrinal landscape, anchored in statutory text and using Skidmore respect rather than Chevron deference as the analytical frame. If you have a USCIS delay and want a case evaluation, I am admitted in New York, New Jersey, Texas, and Missouri and litigate in federal district courts nationwide.
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